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Abstract 
 
As a result of the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the ECB was 
vested with significant supervisory tasks in the prudential field. The ECB exercises 
these tasks with a view to contribute to the safety and soundness of credit institutions 
and the stability of the financial system. Besides its objectives, the ECB is, when 
exercising its tasks, also subject to a specific duty of care for the unity and integrity of 
the internal market. The fact that the ECB was vested with this duty is noteworthy. It 
is neither at first obvious why the ECB ought to be subject to such a special duty; nor 
is it clear what this duty precisely entails. The aim of this article is to examine the 
ECB’s duty of care and its raison d’être. In this process, it will offer suggestions on 
how the ECB ought to discharge it.  
 
Introduction 
 
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as the first pillar of a 
Banking Union, led to a significant transfer of competences from the national to the 
EU level. The SSM places the ECB at the heart of a new system of prudential 
supervision within the Banking Union. It vests it with significant tasks and entrusts it 
with a mandate to contribute to the safety/soundness of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system. Combined with its other tasks, especially its role as 
guardian of the single currency, the ECB is undoubtedly one of the EU’s most 
powerful institutions.  
However, the transfer of supervisory competences to the ECB, as part of the 
establishment of the SSM and the Banking Union, was also a source of concern for 
some. Specifically, concerns were raised about the future of the internal market in a 
more fractured EU: i.e., in an EU where a group of Member States (the Eurozone) 
continues to seek closer integration of which other Member States decide to abstain. 
In response to these concerns, provisions were agreed with the aim of addressing 
potential threats to the internal market.
 1
 Among other provisions, art.1 of Council 
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1
 Demands for internal market safeguards go back to at least December 2011 when the UK government 
attempted – unsuccessfully – to obtain safeguards from other Member States in return for agreeing to 
Treaty changes that would have buttressed fiscal coordination among Eurozone countries (see Letter 
from George Osborne to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, “Draft UK Requests on Financial 
Services at the December 2011 European Council” (February 2012), 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/treasury/120228-
LetterfromChxtoChair.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]). Safeguards were agreed in various shapes and 
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Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which vests the ECB with specific tasks concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (the ‘SSM 
Regulation’), was adopted.2 It states that the ECB has both a duty to have ‘full regard’ 
and a ‘duty of care’ ‘for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal 
treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage’. The 
ECB’s duty of care was championed by the European Parliament as a – supposedly – 
important internal market safeguard. As the (former) chairwoman of the European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee put it during the debates on 
the Banking Union/SSM:  
 
‘More work needs to be done to protect the single market. A duty of care must 
be required from the ECB in relation to the single market, in the same way 
that it is required of the Commission’3 
 
The aim of this article is two-fold. First of all, the paper seeks to offer an assessment 
of the raison d’être of the duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal 
market. Admittedly, it is not obvious why the ECB ought to be subject to special 
safeguards regarding the unity or integrity of the internal market. I will show that the 
matter must be seen in light of the functional and geographical scope of prudential 
supervision in the EU. The second aim is to offer an assessment of the substance of 
the duty of care and especially to consider how the ECB ought to discharge it. While 
the literature on the SSM and the Banking Union continues to grow,
4
 no attempt has 
                                                                                                                                                              
forms subsequently: see e.g. Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ 
L201/1. Moreover, at the European Council in June 2012, European leaders agreed to the need for 
‘concrete proposals on preserving the unity and integrity of the Single Market in financial services’. 
See European Council, Conclusions (28/29 June 2012), para.4, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf [Accessed 23 
August 2016]. 
2
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
[2013] OJ L287/63. 
3
 Debates of the European Parliament, 12 September 2012, p.173, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+CRE+20120912+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN [Accessed 23 August 
2016]. 
4
 For first contributions on the SSM, see e.g. E. Ferran and V. Babis, “The European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism” (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255; E. Wymeersch, “The 
Single Supervisory Mechanism or “SSM”, Part One of the Banking Union”, ECGI Law Working Paper 
No. 240/2014 (February 2014); G. Ferrarini and L. Chiarella, “Common Banking Supervision in the 
Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses”, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 223/2013 (August 2013); B. 
Wolfers and T. Voland, “Level the Playing Field: the New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the 
European Central Bank” (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1463; R. Lastra, “Banking Union and 
Single Market: Conflict or Companionship” (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1190; S. 
Seyad, “The Impact of the Proposed Banking Union on the Unity and Integrity of the European Union 
Single Market” (2013) 18 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 99; P. Schammo, 
“Differentiated Integration and the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Which Way Forward for the 
European Banking Authority?” in P. Birkinshaw & A. Biondi (eds), Britain Alone! The Implications 
and Consequences of United Kingdom Exit from the EU (The Netherlands: Kluwer International, 
2016); D. Busch and G. Ferrarini, European Banking Union (Oxford: OUP, 2015). In this paper, I am 
not assessing the broader question of the constitutional impact of closer integration within the 
Eurozone of which the SSM is an important part. For contributions to this debate, see e.g., K. Tuori and 
K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis – a Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge: CUP 2014), A Hinarejos, The 
Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford: OUP, 2015); F. Fabbrini, Economic 
Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes, Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: OUP, 2016). 
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so far been made to assess the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the 
internal market. With respect to this duty, I will argue that it is effectively ‘conduct-
focused’. Accordingly, this article rejects the idea that the duty of care commits the 
ECB to securing the unity or integrity of the internal market. Suggestions will be 
offered on how the ECB should discharge it. In the process of assessing the ECB’s 
duty of care, I will also assess its relationship with the case law on duty of care (or 
duty of diligence) which the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court’) has 
championed. Indeed, the Court has long insisted that EU institutions such as the 
Commission owe a duty of care. However, I will argue that the latter should not be 
confounded with the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal 
market.   
To address the above aims, this article proceeds as follows. It begins by 
assessing the raison d’être of the duty of care for the unity and integrity of the 
internal market. It then goes on to present the duty of care concept and offer a 
normative assessment. It ends with a few concluding comments. 
 
The raison d’être of the ECB’s duty of care: prudential supervision and the 
internal market 
 
This section examines the raison d’être of the ECB’s duty of care: i.e., to contribute 
to addressing potential threats to the unity/integrity (or the ‘singleness’) of the internal 
market caused by supervisory activities. A priori, this is somewhat counter-intuitive 
since sound supervision, by promoting confidence and stability, contributes to 
ensuring that the single market functions properly. However, as we will see, there is 
room for tension. To assess the raison d’être, two issues need to be clarified: first, the 
functional scope of supervision by which I mean the prudential activities or functions 
which supervisory authorities undertake; and secondly, the geographical scope of 
these activities by which I mean the distribution of prudential oversight competences 
in the banking sector in the wake of the establishment of the SSM.  
 
The functional scope of prudential supervision  
 
This sub-section looks at the functional scope of prudential supervision with a view to 
explaining how the exercise of supervisory activities might come to disrupt the 
functioning of the internal market. However, I will first begin by introducing the 
subject area: prudential supervision.  
In the prudential field, it is common to differentiate between micro- and 
macro-prudential supervision. Micro-prudential supervision focuses on the safety and 
soundness of individual credit institutions.
5
 It deals with matters such as the licensing 
of credit institutions, the supervision of individual banks, the enforcement of rules and 
regulations, etc.
6
 Macro-prudential supervision is meanwhile about the stability of the 
                                                        
5
 Supervisors may have other objectives (e.g. consumer protection) besides this primary objective. 
According to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision of the Basel Committee, any such 
other objectives should not conflict with the primary objective. See Bank for International Settlements 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” 
(September 2012), pp.4-5, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
6
 A typical list of micro-prudential tools includes instruments such as those found in art.4 of the SSM 
Regulation. See E. Wymeersch, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism or “SSM”, Part One of the 
Banking Union”, National Bank of Belgium, Working Paper Research No 255 (April 2014) p.13, 
https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/wp/wp255en.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016], describing the 
list as ‘constitut[ing] the core activity of any prudential supervisor’. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, 
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financial system as a whole.
7
 It was one of the great lessons of the financial crisis that 
more attention needed to be paid to the latter.
8
 From this emerged a much greater 
focus on macro-prudential policy as a key area for addressing systemic risk which had 
hitherto gone unnoticed by supervisors who were primarily focused on the oversight 
of individual institutions.
9
 The legal bases of much of the macro-prudential toolkit are 
found in EU capital requirements legislation (that is, the CRD IV and CRR),
10
 
although some tools have purely a national origin.
11
 The macro-prudential toolkit 
includes instruments such as capital surcharges, requirements regarding liquidity or 
other bank balance sheet restrictions,
12
 but also measures which target borrowers 
instead of banks: e.g. caps such as loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI) and 
debt service-to-income (DSTI) caps.
13
 Capital buffers are common instruments in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
“European Single Supervisory Mechanism for Banks - a First Step on the Road to a Banking Union”, 
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report (July 2013), p.16, 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly_Report_Articles/2013/20
13_076_single.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [Accessed 23 August 2016], noting that ‘... the tasks 
conferred on the ECB essentially cover the entire spectrum of material rules relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions …’. 
7
 e.g. European Central Bank, “Financial Stability Review” (May 2014), p.135, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201405en.pdf??b9ad281efe7751025d
d1bb9b6673e07c [Accessed 23 August 2016].  
8
 e.g. The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, “Report” (25 February 2009), p.39, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf [Accessed 23 August 
2016]; FSA Turner Review, “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis” (March 2009) p.84, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
9
 For an overview of developments in this area, see A. Baker, “Macroprudential Regulation” in D. 
Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (Oxford: OUP 2014) p.172. 
10
 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] 
OJ L176/338; Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1. See also European Systemic Risk Board, “Flagship Report on  
Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” (March 2014), p.21, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_flagship_report.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016], 
highlighting CRD arts 130 and 135-140 (countercyclical capital buffer); CRD Art 131 (systematically 
important institution buffer); CRD arts 133 and 134 (systemic risk buffer); CRD Art 105 (liquidity 
requirements under so-called Pillar 2); CRD art 103 (other macroprudential use of Pillar 2); CRR Art 
458 (for higher requirements on capital, liquidity, large exposures and risk weights); CRR Art 124 (for 
higher real estate risk weights and stricter lending criteria); CRR Art 164 (for higher minimum 
exposure weighed average LGDs).   
11
 The latter include loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI) or debt service-to-income (DSTI) caps. 
The caps affect the credit which a person is able to borrow by taking as a measure the value of real 
estate (LTV cap) or the income of the borrower ((LTI/DSTI cap). See European Systemic Risk Board, 
“The ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” p.8, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_esrb_handbook_mp.en.pdf?ac426900762d505b12c3
ae8a225a8fe5 [Accessed 23 August 2016].  
12
 See I. Angeloni, “Towards a Macro-Prudential Framework for the Single Supervisory Area” (20 
April 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150420.en.html [Accessed 
23 August 2016]. For a more detailed overview, see e.g. ESRB, “Flagship Report” (fn.10); “ESRB 
Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector’ (fn.11).   
13
 The caps affect the credit which a person is able to borrow by taking as a measure the value of real 
estate (LTV cap) or the income of the borrower ((LTI/DSTI cap). Note however that these caps have a 
national, as opposed to an EU, origin. See ‘ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential 
Policy in the Banking Sector’ (fn.11) p.8. 
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capital-based toolkit.
14
 A countercyclical buffer for example attempts to counteract 
pro-cyclicality in the financial system by seeking to act on a bank’s lending activity.15 
Specifically, during an economic ‘upswing’, a buffer can contribute to dealing with 
the development of vulnerabilities in the banking system by raising the cost of capital 
for banks, thereby seeking to prevent credit from becoming too cheap and banks from 
lending excessively. During an economic downswing, ‘releasing’ the buffer can help 
to improve the resilience of the banking system and thereby help to make sure that the 
economy continues to benefit from a steady supply of credit.
16
  
However, there are complications. Firstly, there is an element of conjecture in 
forecasting the effects of prudential action. Indeed, the effectiveness of, say, capital 
requirements depends a great deal on how banks decide to react to the imposition of 
such requirements.
17
 They can respond to an increase in capital requirements – 
supposed to incentivise them to curb excessive lending activities – by reducing risk-
weighted assets (that is, assets that are weighed according to their riskiness).
18
 As a 
result, they might also decide to reduce lending activities.
19
 However, they might also 
respond by retaining earnings, reducing dividend payments, raising new capital, 
possibly using existing (voluntary) buffers to absorb the increase, or try to transfer 
capital within their group. Secondly, complications arise because of the way in which 
micro- and macro-prudential supervision can interact. They can complement each 
other, but there is also room for tension or conflict.
20
 Tensions might for example 
arise during economic downturns when the objectives of macro- and micro-prudential 
supervisors can differ. Thus, for the former loosening regulatory requirements might 
                                                        
14
 European capital requirements legislation makes provision for a variety of capital buffers. Among 
the relevant provisions are arts 130 and 135-140 CRD (countercyclical capital buffer); art. 131 CRD 
(systemically important institution buffer); arts 133 and 134 CRD (systemic risk buffer); art. 129 CRD 
(capital conservation buffer). For a description of the purpose of each of these buffers, see European 
Commission, “Capital Requirements – CRD IV/CRR – Frequently Asked Questions” (16 July 2013), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm [Accessed 23 August 2016] and “ESRB 
Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” (fn.11). 
15
 See for details “ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” 
(fn.11) pp.25-47.  
16
 ESRB, “Flagship Report” (fn.10) p.12. 
17
 In relation to the CCB, see for details “ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential 
Policy in the Banking Sector’ (fn.11) p.31. For a study assessing the effects of raising capital 
requirements on cross-border bank lending activities, see e.g. S. Aiyar, C. Calomiris, J. Hooley, Y. 
Korniyenko and T. Wieladek, “The International Transmission of Bank Capital Requirements: 
Evidence from the United Kingdom” Bank of England Working Paper No. 497 (April 2014) finding 
that banks tend to respond to an increase in capital requirements by reducing cross-border credit to 
banks rather than to firms or households ‘suggesting that cross‐border spillovers are transmitted 
primarily through a liquidity shock to the foreign banking system’. See also S. Ongena, A. Popov and 
G. Udell, ‘“When the cat’s away the mice will play”: does regulation at home affect bank risk-taking 
abroad?’ (2013) 108 Journal of Financial Economics, p.727. 
18
 The riskier an asset, the more capital a bank must have. 
19
 “ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector” (fn.11) p.31. 
20
 See e.g. J. Osiński, K. Seal and L. Hoogduin, “Macroprudential and Microprudential Policies: 
Toward Cohabitation”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/05 (June 2013) p.9, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1305.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. See also ECB, 
“Financial Stability Review” (fn.7) p.135, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201405en.pdf??b9ad281efe7751025d
d1bb9b6673e07c [Accessed 23 August 2016]; S. Claessens “An Overview of Macroprudential Policy 
Tools”, IMF Working Paper WP/14/214, pp.10-11, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14214.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]; P. Angelini, 
S. Nicoletti-Altimari and I. Visco, “Macroprudential, Microprudential and Monetary Policies: Conflicts, 
Complementarities and Trade-offs”, Questioni di Economia e Finanza Number 140 (November 2012), 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2012-0140/QEF_140.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016].  
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be an appropriate strategy during downturns since it might facilitate the supply of 
credit to the economy.
 21
 Yet for the latter the opposite may be true: maintaining or 
tightening requirements might be necessary in order to ensure that the interests of 
depositors are protected.
22
 Thirdly, questions over tensions and complementarities 
also arise in relation to other areas,
23
 such as monetary policy.
24
 Indeed, much been 
said about potential conflicts between monetary policy and supervision. The EU 
legislature insisted on a clear separation of functions when vesting the ECB with its 
supervisory tasks.
25
 However, this is not to say that it is desirable that each function 
takes place in a vacuum. There are benefits to be reaped, especially in terms of 
information sharing between both functions.
26
 
Fourthly – and crucially for our purposes – prudential action can affect the 
internal market and the free movement principles which underpin it. To be sure, the 
objectives of prudential supervision, its emphasis on the safety and soundness of 
banks and the stability of the financial system are meant to contribute importantly to 
the proper functioning of a single market: for example, in the case of macro-
prudential policy by addressing systemic risk and the externalities which give rise to 
such risk.
27
 However, the tools that micro- and macro-prudential supervisors have at 
their disposal can potentially cause fragmentation or otherwise disrupt the working of 
the internal market. These tools include (micro-prudential) tools such as licensing 
which conditions access to host states,
28
 but also tools which are more complex to use 
and whose effects are more complex to assess: think of capital or liquidity buffers for 
                                                        
21
 Claessens “An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools” (fn.20) p.11. See also ESRB, “Flagship 
Report” (n 10) 16. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 See e.g. Claessens, “An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools” (n 20) 10-11 (focusing on 
macro-prudential policy).  
24
 See I. Angeloni, “Towards a Macro-Prudential Framework for the Single Supervisory Area” (20 
April 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150420.en.html#17 
[Accessed 23 August 2016], with respect to monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. See also 
International Monetary Fund, “The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies’ (29 January 
2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012913.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]; P Fisher, 
“Microprudential, Macroprudential and Monetary Policy: Conflict, Compromise or Co-ordination?” (1 
October 2014), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech759.pdf [Accessed 23 
August 2015]. 
25
 See e.g. recitals 65 and 73, art.25 SSM Regulation. See also ECB, “Decision of the European Central 
Bank of 17 September 2014 on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy and 
supervision functions of the European Central Bank” (ECB/2014/39), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_ecb_2014_39_f_sign.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
26
 See in this context ECB, “Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014” (fn.25), 
Recital 14. In the case of the ECB, confidential information between the supervisory and monetary 
policy functions can be exchanged on a ‘need to know’ basis and according to rules set out in the above 
ECB decision (see arts 5 and 6). See also art.8 on the special provisions governing exchange of 
information in emergency situations. 
27
 See also in this context Recital 27 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331/1, noting that ‘…systemic 
risks include risks of disruption to financial services caused by a significant impairment of all or parts 
of the Union’s financial system that have the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
internal market and the real economy’. 
28
 Recital 20 SSM Regulation, noting that licensing (i.e. prior authorization) ‘for taking up the business 
of credit institutions is a key prudential technique …’.  
 7 
instance.
29
 Such prudential measures can have important spillover effects across 
jurisdictional boundaries which affect cross-border flows of capital. To be sure, from 
a macro-prudential point of view, cross-border effects might be intended. Thus, in the 
case of interconnected jurisdictions whose financial cycles coincide, capital buffers 
can have similar positive effects by, say, counteracting the effects of excessive credit 
growth during economic upturns. However, problems arise in the case of 
uncoordinated action or where prudential measures are discriminatory or 
disproportionate. This might for example be the case where prudential measures are 
used in order to ‘ring fence’30 bank capital or liquidity domestically: for instance at 
the level of a subsidiary located in a host jurisdiction with a parent entity located 
elsewhere.
31
 Ring fencing has been the subject of controversy. While it is seen by 
some as a necessary and legitimate means to protect local economies from the effects 
of capital or liquidity transfers between jurisdictions,
32
 EBA has described it as the 
‘most severe case of damaging the internal market’. 33  Measures might also be 
considered undesirable because they unlevel the playing field: for example where 
institutions holding the same portfolios are subject to different capital requirements in 
different Member States.
34
  
There are of course rules in place for dealing with internal market 
disruptions.
35
 There will be more to say about safeguards later. For now suffices to 
note that various national authorities adopted ‘ring fencing’ measures during the 
financial crisis years.
36
 These were either individual measures or measures affecting 
the banking system as a whole.
37
 As the Commission noted: 
 
‘some banking supervisors introduced measures with ‘ring-fencing’ effects 
between 2008 and 2013, mostly in response to the economic and financial 
                                                        
29
 See also generally on this issue, European Banking Authority, “EBA Opinion on the 
Macroprudential Rules in CRR/CRD”, EBA/Op/2014/06 (30 June 2014).  
30
 For the Commission ‘ring-fencing’ arises where competent authorities ‘take actions aimed at 
retaining liquidity, dividends and other bank assets within national borders’ (see Commission, “Legal 
Obstacles to the Free Movement of Funds between Institutions within a Single Liquidity Sub-group” 
COM(2014) 327 final, p.4).  
31
 See also European Banking Authority, “EBA Opinion on the Macroprudential Rules in CRR/CRD’ 
(fn.29) p.32 (note 23), noting that ‘ring fencing’ can be achieved if ‘… a Member State restricts the 
flow of capital between subsidiaries (or sub-consolidated levels) of a group by requiring that the 
subsidiaries (or sub-consolidated levels) in its jurisdiction must hold a certain amount of capital, 
effectively locking in the capital within that subsidiary (or sub-consolidated level)’. 
32
 See in this context the opinion article by M. Hampl and V. Tomšík (vice-governors of the Czech 
national bank), “Europe Risks Creating another Icesave”, Financial Times, (18 July 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e1e635be-b173-11e0-9444-00144feab49a.html#axzz3xyEMW61o 
[Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
33
 European Banking Authority, “EBA Opinion on the Macroprudential Rules in CRR/CRD” (fn.29) 
p.15. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 See e.g. the Treaty freedoms (but recall that obstacles can be justified: see e.g. in the context of the 
free movement of capital, art.65(1)(b) TFEU). Provisions in capital requirements legislation also 
address internal market concerns (e.g. art.458(4) CRR). 
36
 According to the Commission, areas in which such measures were identified were in the Pillar 2 area, 
the large exposure regime and under domestic liquidity frameworks. See Commission, “Legal 
Obstacles to the Free Movement of Funds” (fn.30) p.4. See also Commission, “Commission Staff 
Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments” SWD(2015) 58 final, 
p. 27.  
37
 “Staff Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments” (fn.36) p.27. 
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crisis, in order to keep bank assets within national borders or to pre-emptively 
strengthen the liquidity position of local banks’38 
 
The Commission also noted that:  
 
‘…  in certain cases supervisors decided to take action unilaterally, without 
consulting the other supervisors concerned, even in areas where EU banking 
legislation so requires. ... In addition, some of the measures reported raised 
questions about their appropriateness and proportionality in relation to the 
prudential concerns they were designed to address. Ring-fencing along 
national borders has thus increased market fragmentation …’.39 
 
Hence, the relationship between prudential action and the internal market can be 
complex and multi-faceted. Indeed, this relationship is arguably further complicated 
by the fact that macro-prudential policy, its effects and concepts, are not yet fully 
understood.
 40
 Admittedly, since the financial crisis, the prudential framework has 
grown in sophistication both substantively and institutionally. We saw the 
establishment of the SSM in 2013. However, the SSM has not put the above 
problematic fully to rest. To appreciate this point, we need to look closer at the 
geography of supervision, to which I turn now.  
 
The geographical scope of prudential supervision  
 
In the above section, I looked at the tools which supervisors have at their disposal and 
how their use might come to affect the internal market. However, I left questions 
about the geography of supervision in the micro- and macro-prudential fields aside. 
By geography of supervision, I mean the distribution of prudential oversight 
competences in the wake of the establishment of the SSM. In order to make sense of 
the internal market problematic that I highlighted above, this aspect needs closer 
investigation.  
The establishment of the SSM marked a significant shift towards centralised 
supervision. Like the BU, the decision to put the SSM in place is firmly tied to the 
Eurozone’s efforts to get a handle on the sovereign debt crisis which hit the Eurozone 
in the years that followed the financial crisis. However, as we will see, the SSM is 
geographically limited to a group of Member States. As a result, the EU institutional 
set-up in the prudential field is rather complex. I will begin by looking at the 
geography of prudential supervision in the SSM area, after which I will turn to the 
whole of the EU. In each part, I will seek to clarify how the geography of supervision 
relates to concerns over internal market disruptions.  
                                                        
38
 Ibid. See also Commission, “A Single Market for Growth and Jobs: an Analysis of Progress made 
and remaining Obstacles in the Member States’ COM(2013) 785 final, p.9. For further examples, see 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Transition Report 2012: Integration Across 
Borders”, p.54, 
http://www.finpolconsult.de/mediapool/16/169624/data/Housing_Markets/EBRD_Transition_Report_1
2.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
39
 “Commission Staff Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments” 
(fn.36) p.27. 
40
 See e.g. Claessens, “An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools” (fn.20). See also Angeloni, 
“Towards a Macro-Prudential Framework for the Single Supervisory Area” (fn.12) noting that using 
macro-prudential policy in SSM area will be difficult ‘partly because some of the concepts are not yet 
sufficiently developed’. 
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Geographical scope (I): prudential supervision in the SSM area 
 
As noted, the SSM does not extend to the EU as a whole. It is an example of closer 
integration among a group of Member States (known as ‘participating Member 
States’), which are first and foremost Eurozone countries. The SSM is also open to 
Member States which do not have the euro as their currency. However, to join the 
SSM, these non-Euro Member States must enter into a close cooperation agreement 
with the ECB and as such submit to the authority of the ECB in its role under the 
SSM Regulation.
41
 I will first look at micro-prudential supervision in the SSM area, 
after which I will turn to macro-prudential supervision in this area.  
 
- Micro-prudential supervision in the SSM area 
 
The establishment of the SSM changed the institutional landscape in the micro-
prudential area. It led to a significant transfer of competences from participating 
Member States to the ECB. The ECB became a day-to-day micro-prudential 
supervisor with broad powers.
 42
 Admittedly, the ECB only directly supervises 
‘supervised entities’ or ‘supervised groups’ which are judged to be ‘significant’ 
according to criteria set out in the SSM Regulation and the SSM Framework 
Regulation.
43
 ‘Less significant’ supervised entities will as a general rule be supervised 
by the authorities of participating Member States.
44
 That said, even if an institution is 
deemed to be ‘less significant’, the ECB will solely be competent to (i) authorise or 
withdraw the authorisation of a credit institution and (ii) assess the notifications of the 
acquisition and disposal of holdings in credit institutions.
45
 Moreover, authorities of 
participating Member States are subject to the authority of the ECB, which has also an 
oversight role to play.
46
 Indeed, the SSM Regulation goes as far as providing that the 
ECB can take over the supervision of a credit institution which would otherwise be 
                                                        
41
 See art.7 SSM Regulation.  
42
 For details on the ECB’s tasks, see art.4 SSM Regulation (to be applied according to the criteria set 
out in art.6(4)). Note that the ECB is also responsible ‘for the effective and consistent functioning of 
the SSM’ (art.6(1)).  
43
 The SSM Regulation refers to size, importance for the economy, or significance of cross-border 
activities (see art.6(4) sub-para 1). Significance is established on an individual or on a consolidated 
basis. See for details Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation with the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the 
European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities 
(SSM Framework Regulation) [2014] OJ L141/1. However, the SSM Regulation makes it plain that a 
bank should generally ‘not be considered less significant’ – and hence be subject to direct supervision 
by the ECB – in one of the following scenarios: the total value of its assets is more than 30 billion 
euros; the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating Member State represents more than 
20% ‘unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion’; or where a national competent 
authority notifies the ECB that it considers an institution to be of significant domestic economic 
relevance and the ECB, after evaluation, confirms its significance.
 
An institution must also be 
considered significant where public financial assistance has been requested or received ‘directly from 
the ESFS or the ESM’. The regulation also provides for the ECB to consider of its own initiative an 
institution to be significant in case where the latter operates across the border by way of subsidiaries in 
at least one participating Member States and where its cross-border assets or liabilities ‘represent a 
significant part of its total assets or liabilities’. Finally, the regulation requires the ECB to carry out its 
supervisory tasks in relation to the ‘three most significant credit institutions’ in each participating 
Member State ‘unless justified by particular circumstances’. See art.6(4). ‘Supervised entity’ and 
‘supervised group’ are among the terms that are defined in art.2 of the SSM Framework Regulation.   
44
 See art.6(4) SSM Regulation. 
45
 See art.6(4).  
46
 See art.6(5)(c).  
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subject to national supervision if ‘necessary to ensure consistent application of high 
supervisory standards’.47  
Hence, the ECB plays a key micro-prudential role in the SSM area. Because 
the ECB was vested with supervisory tasks, the traditional home-host model has been 
significantly eroded as an arrangement that governs the relations between authorities 
within the SSM space.
 48
 Recall that together with the principle of mutual recognition, 
the home-host model – especially the home country principle – is key for distributing 
supervisory competences among horizontally arrayed national authorities in many 
regulatory fields. Specifically, the home-host model has lost most of its significance 
where the ECB assumes competence in lieu of national authorities pursuant to the 
SSM Regulation.
49
 Moreover, whilst national authorities continue to act as home and 
host authorities in the case of less significant entities,
50
 they nevertheless act in the 
shadow of the ECB which has, as noted, inter alia an oversight role to play.
51
 For 
groups, the ECB may now also act as consolidating supervisor (based on the 
‘significance’ criteria), hence assuming competences that were hitherto exercised by 
national authorities.
52
  
One of the expectations associated with these changes is that they will resolve 
some of the problems of the past: for example, the fact that some supervisors were 
seen as biased. Such behaviour unlevels the playing field and has also been associated 
with ‘ring-fencing’ that is prejudicial to the internal market and that I described in the 
previous section. As Danièle Nouy, chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board put it 
somewhat bullishly when describing the benefits of the Banking Union for financial 
markets and the single market:  
 
‘…the possibility of “national bias” playing a part in supervision will be 
eliminated. Under the old supervisory system, situations may have occurred in 
which supervisory agencies treated national and foreign institutions 
differently. This allowed for behaviours such as the promotion of national 
champions and the ring-fencing of capital, which clearly distorted the 
functioning of free financial markets and created de facto barriers to the single 
European market’.53 
 
                                                        
47
 See art.6(5)(b). The provision adds that the ECB can also do so ‘where financial assistance has been 
requested or received indirectly from the ESFS or the ESM’. 
48
 Note that whilst the home-host model applies in relation to branches, it is also common to use this 
terminology in relation to subsidiaries in a cross-border context.  
49
 However, even when the ECB assumes direct supervisory competence, cooperation between national 
authorities and the ECB is crucial at the operational level. See for details on the procedure applying in 
relation to the establishment of branches where the ECB is competent according to the ‘significance’ 
criteria, art.11(1) and (3) SSM Framework Regulation. For the free provision of services, see art.12(1) 
SSM Framework Regulation. See also in this context art.17(1) SSM Regulation which states that 
existing procedures for the exercise of cross-border rights (by way of the free provision of services or 
the establishment of branches) and home-host competence remain unchanged ‘for the purposes of the 
tasks not conferred on the ECB by Article 4 [of the SSM Regulation]’ (emphasis added). 
50
 See art.11(2) and (4) SSM Framework Regulation in relation to the establishment of branches. For 
the free provision of services, see art.12(2). However, recall also that the ECB is competent to 
authorise credit institutions irrespective of the ‘significance’ criterion. 
51
 See also art.6(5)(b) SSM Regulation which allows the ECB to take over supervision from national 
authorities.  
52
 See art.8 SSM Framework Regulation. See also art.17(2) SSM Regulation.  
53
 D. Nouy, “The Banking Union and Financial Integration’ (27 April 2015),  
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150427.en.html#2 
[Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
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That said, scope for supervisory failures will undoubtedly remain. No institutional 
arrangement is fool proof and even if the ECB is better placed than national 
authorities to take a pan-SSM view, national authorities, whose failings contributed 
importantly to bringing about the SSM, ultimately continue to play an important role 
in the ECB’s decision-making processes. Moreover, as we will see below when 
considering supervisory arrangements outside the SSM area, the fact that the ECB 
was vested with supervisory competence did not put concerns over internal market 
disruptions to rest.   
 
- Macro-prudential supervision in the SSM area 
 
In contrast to the ECB’s micro-prudential competences, the ECB’s role in macro-
prudential supervision is more limited. The main actors in the macro-prudential field 
are national bodies. By national bodies, I mean mainly central banks. However, 
financial supervisors or cross-institutional committees, which bring together 
representatives from different bodies, might also be competent.
54
 The ECB’s powers 
in the macro-prudential field are said to be asymmetrical. The main provision is art.5 
of the SSM Regulation. The thrust of this provision is to allow the ECB to tighten 
macro-prudential tools: i.e., to apply higher requirements or more stringent measures 
than authorities/bodies in participating Member States.
55
 However, the ECB cannot 
loosen measures. Moreover, some tools – say LTV and LTI caps – are out of the 
ECB’s reach because they have no EU origin, but are based purely on national law.  
Hence, the institutional landscape in the macro-prudential and micro-
prudential fields differ markedly. The prime competence of national 
authorities/bodies in macro-prudential supervision is believed to be justified because 
of continuing differences between Member States: for instance in terms of their 
financial cycles or in terms of systemic risks which they might come to face.
56
 Hence, 
the argument is that more granular action (i.e., action at Member State level, as 
opposed action at EU level) might be more appropriate.  
However, national authorities have national mandates and their life and death 
are decided nationally. Unsurprisingly, there is a risk that unilateral actions by 
Member State authorities have detrimental effects beyond national borders. These 
negative effects are externalities for other jurisdictions and they may come to disrupt 
the internal market. Indeed, these risks do not just appear to be academic since 
national authorities do not in actual practice appear to spend much effort on 
examining potential cross-border effects.
57
 Moreover, inaction by national authorities 
                                                        
54
 See e.g. V. Constâncio, “Strengthening Macroprudential Policy in Europe” (3 July 2015), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150703.en.html#footnote.10 [Accessed 23 
August 2016], noting that ‘[h]eterogeneity also extends to the competent authorities for implementing 
the measures. In some countries it is the central government, in others it is the central bank, and in still 
others authority is in the hands of a committee that involves different national bodies (cross-
institutional committee)’.  
55
 See art.5(2). 
56
 See IMF Country Report, “European Union: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Documentation - Technical Note on Macroprudential Oversight and the Role of the ESRB”, IMF 
Country Report No. 13/71 (March 2013) p.21 noting that ‘[n]ational authorities will be allowed to 
retain macroprudential powers under the SSM – providing flexibility to tailor solutions to local 
conditions—but in close cooperation with the ECB’; cf. ECB, “Opinion of the European Central Bank 
of 25 January 2012 …” [2012] OJ C105/1, p.4 noting that ‘… economic and financial cycles are not 
completely harmonised across Member States, and Member States may face different types of systemic 
risk’. 
57
 European Systemic Risk Board, “A Review of Macro-Prudential Policy in the EU one Year after the 
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might just as much be an issue than action. During economic boom times, for 
example, national authorities might be reticent to intervene by tightening macro-
prudential measures.
58
  
To be sure, a number of safeguards were put in place in order to address these 
risks. As noted, the ECB has macro-prudential powers. Thus, the fact that the ECB 
can tighten macro-prudential measures which have an EU origin should contribute to 
preventing any ‘inaction bias’. 59  Moreover, to prevent uncoordinated action by 
national authorities, art.5 of the SSM Regulation sets out a notification procedure 
between national authorities and the ECB.
60
 Generally speaking, it is expected that the 
ECB will, within the scope of its powers, seek to ensure that potential cross-border 
externalities among participating Member States are identified.
61
 However, it is also 
worth acknowledging that the ECB’s own macro-prudential powers can have 
unwanted side-effects: for example, if actions lack sufficient granularity or if country 
specificities are not taken properly into account by ECB. Art.5 of the SSM Regulation 
seeks to address this type of concern by putting in place notification requirements and 
requiring the ECB to cooperate with the relevant national authorities.
62
 Moreover, 
art.5(5) states explicitly that when taking macro-prudential action, the ECB must take 
‘into account’ the specificities of the ‘financial system, economic situation and the 
economic cycle in individual Member States or parts thereof’. However, it does not 
explicitly require the ECB to have regard to the internal market.
63
  
 
Geographical scope (II): prudential supervision in the EU as a whole 
 
To fully make sense of the problematic which links prudential supervision to threats 
to the singleness of the internal market, it is crucial to pay closer attention to the 
limited geographical scope of the SSM. As previously noted, the SSM does not 
extend to the whole of the EU. It is an example of closer integration among a group of 
Member States which are currently all Eurozone Member States. Outside the SSM 
area, micro- and macro-prudential supervision remains primarily a matter for national 
authorities. These authorities are central banks, financial authorities and possibly 
                                                                                                                                                              
Introduction of the CRD/CRR” (June 2015), 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_review_macroprudential_policy_one_year_after_int
ro_crdcrr.en.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016], noting that ‘[i]n general, national authorities do not 
analyse the potential cross-border effects of national macroprudential measures in great detail’. See 
ECB, “Annual Report 2014” (2015), p.58, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2014en.pdf?e0dd86a5e7ab86204869c181ad6c1478 
[Accessed 23 August 2016], noting that ‘… the assessment by authorities of the potential cross-border 
impact of national measures has been rather limited, although work on the matter has been carried out 
by the ESRB’. 
58
 C. Salleo, “Single Market versus Eurozone” in F. Allen, E. Carletti and J. Gray (eds), The New 
Financial Architecture in the Eurozone (Florence: European University Institute, 2015, RSCAS, 
Florence School of Banking and Finance), p.179, at p.189. 
59
 See also art.102 SSM Framework Regulation which clarifies that the ECB is not prevented from 
setting buffer requirements where a national authority does not set a buffer rate. 
60
 See also arts 101-105 SSM Framework Regulation. 
61
 IMF Country Report (fn.56) p.21, noting that ‘[t]he macroprudential powers of the ECB will 
facilitate early identification and action on systemic risks, and enhance information sharing, home host 
coordination, and internalization of cross-border externalities within the SSM’. 
62
 See art.5(4) SSM Regulation.  
63
 Other provisions however do. See e.g. art.1 SSM Regulation. See also the provisions of the 
CRD/CRR.  
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other bodies which bring together representatives from different institutions, 
including national governments.
64
  
Because the SSM does not extend to the EU as a whole, the allocation of 
powers and competences between Member States which are part of the SSM and 
those that are not continues to be based on the traditional home-host model. However, 
following the establishment of the SSM, the ECB will assume functions that were 
previously exercised by national authorities that are now part of the SSM. Thus, the 
ECB will, when it is competent according to the SSM Regulation, act in its relations 
with authorities of non-SSM Member States as either the competent authority of the 
home Member State or as competent authority of the host Member State.
65
 For 
groups, it might also act as consolidating supervisor.  
In order to ensure effective cross-border supervision throughout the EU, 
cooperation and coordination arrangements will continue to remain crucial. These 
arrangements include specific obligations to cooperate, but also supervisory colleges 
as far as banking groups are concerned. Interventions by EU bodies such as the 
European Banking Authority or the (non-binding) activities of the European System 
Risk Board at macro-prudential level will also continue to prove important.  
To be sure, even if the SSM is geographically limited, it is expected to benefit 
Member States which are not part of the SSM. This is because a more stable 
Eurozone benefits the EU as a whole. Moreover, even if the home-host model remains 
in place in the relations between the SSM and non-SSM Member States, the ECB 
might prove to be a more effective interlocutor in a home-host setting than some 
national authorities. However, it is also plain that some of the expected benefits of 
ECB supervision which I highlighted earlier – e.g. addressing ‘national bias’ in 
supervisory decisions – cannot be replicated on an EU wide basis. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the SSM, as a geographically limited mechanism, created an entirely 
new set of issues: it opened up a new fracture in the EU’s fabric: that is, between 
Member States that are part of the SSM and those that are not. Unsurprisingly, the 
establishment of the SSM and the Banking Union gave rise to some noticeable 
anxieties in Member States such as the UK. Thus, for the UK, closer integration in the 
Eurozone raised the outlook of the Eurozone and the ECB coming to share interests 
which were at odds with the interests of non-SSM Member States. These anxieties 
were typically intertwined with concerns about the future of the internal market in a 
more fractured Union.
66
 They were voiced inter alia during the UK government’s so-
called ‘Balance of Competences Review’: 
 
                                                        
64
 See e.g. the Financial Stability Council in Sweden, http://www.riksbank.se/en/Financial-
stability/The-Financial-Stability-Council/Council-for-cooperation-on-macroprudential-supervision/ 
[Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
65
 In case of ‘passporting out’ of the SSM area, see art.4(1)(b) SSM Regulation and art.17 SSM 
Framework Regulation. With regard to ‘passporting in’ (i.e. into the SSM area), see art.4(2) SSM 
Regulation and arts 13-17 SSM Framework Regulation. In both scenarios, the distribution of home-
host competence between the ECB and national authorities within the SSM space depends on the 
‘significance’ criteria. However, with respect to the free provision of services, note that that in the case 
of ‘passporting in’, the ECB will carry out the tasks of the authority of the host Member State 
irrespective of the ‘significance’ criterion (see art.16 SSM Framework Regulation).  
66
 See e.g. House of Commons (Foreign Affairs Committee), “The Future of the European Union: UK 
government policy” (First Report of Session 2013-14, Volume I) p.41, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/87/87.pdf [Accessed 23 August 
2016], noting that ‘[t]he Government has been concerned above all about the risk that further 
integration in the Eurozone might ‘spill over’ into the Single Market and jeopardise the UK’s ability to 
participate meaningfully in Single Market decision-making’. 
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While the development of the banking union and the European System of 
Financial Supervision were generally welcomed by stakeholders as important 
responses to the crisis, there were also strong views that the UK, other 
Member States and the EU institutions should ensure that steps to support the 
stability of the euro area do not impair the integrity of the Single Market or act 
against the UK’s national interest67 
 
Hence attempts to stabilize the Eurozone and to vest the ECB with extensive 
supervisory tasks were not welcomed unreservedly. From a UK standpoint, these 
efforts risked being double-edged: by creating conditions for the singleness of the 
internal market to be undermined and threatening inter alia the ability of UK based 
institutions to have access to the internal market.  
Admittedly, following the EU referendum of June 2016, these concerns are 
now dwarfed by a new set of issues regarding the future relationship of the UK with 
the EU and the question of whether UK based institutions will continue benefiting 
from single market access. This is not the place to discuss these issues. Suffices to 
note that the reality of the concerns that were voiced in relation to the Banking Union 
and the SSM remains to be established.
68
 There is in theory room for friction between 
the SSM and non-SSM Member States because prudential policy can be used for 
competitive purposes, hence for purposes other than were intended.
69
 Moreover, even 
where prudential actors share the same overall ambitions (in terms of bank resilience 
for instance), they might still see the world (as it were) through different lenses 
because of, say, structural differences between jurisdictions.
70
 As a result, they may 
also adopt different policy standpoints, which might ultimately create frictions. Be 
that as it may, the likelihood of externalities and more generally of disruptions to the 
internal market will also depend on the effectiveness of the arrangements that are put 
in place in order to address such effects.
71
 These arrangements include a duty of care 
for the integrity and unity of the internal market to which I turn now.  
 
 
 
                                                        
67
 HM Government, “Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union - The Single Market: Financial Services and the Free Movement of Capital” (Summer 
2014) p. 65, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332874/2902400_BoC_
FreedomOfCapital_acc.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
68
 It is worth noting that the UK’s view that the integrity of the internal market might be at threat 
appears to have been significantly shaped by the ECB’s attempt to implement its location policy for 
Central Counterparties (CCPs) (see “Review of the Balance of Competences between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union” (fn.67) p.69). The latter required CCPs which clear significant 
amounts of Euro denominated products to be located in the Eurozone area (e.g. ECB, “Eurosystem 
Oversight Policy Framework” (July 2011) p.10, 
http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/other/eurosystemoversightpolicyframework2011en.pdf [Accessed 23 
August 2016]). The UK successfully challenged the policy before the Court (United Kingdom v 
European Central Bank (ECB) (T-496/11) EU:T:2015:133). However, it is important to note that the 
location policy did not concern the SSM. As noted, the reality of spillovers remains to be determined as 
far as the SSM is concerned. 
69
 Salleo, “Single Market vs. Eurozone” (fn.58), p.193.  
70
 Ibid. As far as the UK is concerned, such structural differences exist. As Salleo points out, banks are 
dominant in the Eurozone while markets play a much more significant role in the UK (ibid). 
71
 The SSM Regulation includes a clause which requires the Commission to report regularly on the 
SSM Regulation ‘with a special emphasis on monitoring the potential impact on the smooth 
functioning of the internal market’ (art.32 SSM Regulation). 
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The ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market 
 
In the previous section, I discussed a specific problematic which links prudential 
supervision to threats to the ‘singleness’ of the internal market. I began by noting that 
effective supervision had an important role to play in ensuring that the internal market 
functioned properly. However, I went on to describe a more complex picture where 
supervisory action could also be a cause of internal market disruptions. I argued in 
this context that the SSM and the ECB were seen both as part of the solution and as 
part of the problem. Thus, within the SSM area, the ECB was viewed as part of a 
solution to issues which had come to be associated with domestic (national) 
supervision in the financial crisis years: e.g. national bias or discriminatory treatment 
of banking institutions which could affect the proper functioning of the internal 
market. However, I noted that in the macro-prudential field the picture was more 
complex because national authorities continued to have primary competence. Outside 
the SSM area – in the UK in particular – a more powerful ECB was also perceived as 
a potential threat to the unity/integrity of the internal market: notwithstanding the 
benefits of a Banking Union in terms of financial stability, the assumption was that 
members of the SSM might over time come to share interests which were at odds with 
those of non-SSM Member States. As a result, the ECB/SSM might fail to internalize 
the cost of its actions which might come to affect, via disruptions to the internal 
market, the interests of non-SSM states in the internal market.  
Against this background, this section assesses the ECB’s duty of care for the 
unity and integrity of the internal market which is found in art.1 of the SSM 
Regulation. As noted in the introduction, the provision was championed as an 
important internal market safeguard by the European Parliament. However, before 
turning to the SSM Regulation, I will first look at existing case law on duty of care 
which the Court applies to EU institutions such as the Commission or indeed the 
ECB. 
 
Duty of care in the Court’s case law 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court’) has long recognised that EU 
institutions owe a duty of care.
72
 While the Court does not necessarily use a ‘duty of 
care’ label or at times uses other labels (e.g. ‘duty of diligence’),73 it is common for 
the Court to speak of an EU administration as having an obligation to ‘carefully and 
impartially’ examine all relevant aspects – factual and legal – of an individual case. 74 
A failure to do so may result in an EU measure being successfully challenged.  
                                                        
72
 See generally on the duty of care, H-P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999) pp.106-165; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP 2012) 
pp.333-340; H. Hofmann, G. Rowe and A. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European 
Union (Oxford: OUP, 2011) pp.446-449. 
73
 Using the notion of a duty of diligence, see e.g. Davidoff SA v Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Case T-108/08) [2011] E.C.R. II-05585 at [28]; MyTravel Group plc v Commission of 
the European Communities (Case T-212/03) [2008] E.C.R II-01967 at [49]. 
74
 See e.g. Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München Mitte (Case C-269/90) [1991] 
E.C.R. I-5469 at [14] referring to a ‘duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and 
impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case’; La Cinq SA v Commission of the European 
Communities (Case T-44/90) [1992] E.C.R. 1992 II-00001 at [86]; Davidoff SA v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Case T-108/08) [2011] E.C.R. II-05585 at [19]; Agraz, SA and 
Others v Commission of the European Communities (Case T-285/03) [2005] E.C.R. 2005 II-01063 at 
[49]. 
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Many of the decisions on duty of care originate from case law dealing with 
grievances that persons have against decisions taken by an EU administration 
exercising powers of administration or management: for instance, in competition law, 
anti-dumping measures, custom duties, or state aid. In Nölle for instance, the Court 
was concerned with verifying whether Community institutions had acted with the 
necessary care when determining a reference country for establishing the value of 
certain Chinese products.
 75
 The choice of a reference country was a matter for 
Community institutions. However, the Court considered that it was within its 
competence to examine whether Community institutions had considered ‘with all the 
care required’ relevant documentary evidence for determining the normal value of the 
Chinese products.
76
 
By insisting on a duty of care, the Court ensures that an EU administration 
does not fall below a certain standard of behavior. For the Court, the duty of care is a 
procedural guarantee, which in its eyes is especially important where an EU 
institution benefits from wide discretion and where the Court’s powers of judicial 
review are as a result more limited.
77
 Moreover, when insisting on a duty of care in 
cases involving grievances such as the above, the Court also offers parties 
protection.
78
 On occasions, the Court has said so explicitly. Thus, in Nölle II, the 
Court noted that the duty of care principle was meant to ‘protect individuals’.79 The 
point was crucial since this finding formed the basis of the Court’s enquiry into 
whether breach of the duty could attract Community liability.
80 
 
                                                        
75
 Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen (Case C-16/90) [1991] E.C.R. I-05163. The point about 
identifying a reference country was to make sure that no account was taken of prices and costs in non-
market economies (which were not the result of market forces). See ibid. at [10].  
76
 Ibid. at [13]. 
77
 See e.g. Agraz, SA and Others v Commission of the European Communities (Case T-285/03) [2005] 
E.C.R. 2005 II-01063 at [49]; Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München Mitte (Case 
C-269/90) [1991] E.C.R. I-5469 at [14]; Nölle v Council of the European Union and Commission (Case 
T-167/94) [1995] E.C.R. II-02589 at [73]; Métropole télévision and Others v Commission (Joined 
Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93) [1996] E.C.R. II-649 at [93]; NVV, Marius Schep 
and NBHV v Commission of the European Communities (Case T-151/05) [2009] E.C.R. II-01219 at 
[163]. 
78
 See also H-P. Nehl, “Good Administration as Procedural Right and/or General Principle?” in H. 
Hofmann and A. Türk, Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law – Towards and Integrated 
Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) pp.322-351, at p.349 noting that ‘… one should 
bear in mind that the EC Courts’ primary concern in reviewing the legality of administrative decision-
making is still aimed at protecting the individual against illegal encroachments upon his or her rights 
and interests’.  
79
 Nölle v Council of the European Union and Commission (Case T-167/94) [1995] E.C.R. II-02589 at 
[76]. See also MyTravel Group plc v Commission of the European Communities (Case T-212/03) 
[2008] E.C.R. II-01967  at [49]. Elsewhere, the Court described the duty of care as applying ‘generally’ 
in the relations of an EU administration ‘with the public’. See Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission of the 
European Communities Case C-47/07 P [2008] E.C.R. I-09761 at [92]. See also art.41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [2012] OJ C326/391 which states inter alia that every person has ‘the right to have 
his or her affairs handled impartially…’, which is inspired by the Court’s case law, including the case 
law on duty of care, such as Nölle v Council of the European Union and Commission (Case T-167/94) 
[1995] E.C.R. II-02589. See ‘Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/convent49_en.htm [Accessed 23 August 
2016].  
80
 Note that the description of the duty of care as a rule which is meant to protect individuals must also 
be seen in the light of the requirements governing non-contractual liability: i.e., that the rule of law 
infringed was intended to confer rights on individuals; that the breach was sufficiently serious; and that 
there is a causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the aggrieved party (e.g., 
Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission of the 
European Communities (Case C-352/98 P) [2000] E.C.R. I-05291 at [42]). The reference to a rule that 
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However, the Court has insisted on the need for impartiality and diligence in 
other contexts as well, which are ostensibly removed from an individual rights 
protection rationale.
81
 For instance, in Netherlands v Commission, the Court found the 
Commission to have breached a duty of care when adopting a decision rejecting 
certain national provisions adopted by the Netherlands under art.114(5) TFEU (art. 
95(5) EC).
82
 The provision in question allows a Member States to seek to derogate 
from measures adopted by way of harmonization under art.114 TFEU (art.95 EC). In 
another case, the Court insisted on assessing whether the Council had acted ‘carefully 
and impartially’ when taking a decision in the context of art.20(2) TEU which allows 
the Council to authorise enhanced cooperation between a group of Member States.
83
 
Meanwhile in Gauweiler, the Court turned to the duty of care requirements in a case 
involving the ECB.
84
 At the heart of this case was the Eurosystem’s outright monetary 
transaction programme (the OMT programme). Under the latter, the ECB offers to 
buy bonds issued by euro Member States in secondary markets. The German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht requested a ruling regarding the validity of certain 
decisions taken in the context of this programme. The European Court noted that 
given the technical choices which the ECB – or more precisely, the European System 
of Central Banks or ‘ESCB’ – was called upon to make in preparing and 
implementing the OMT programme, the ESCB benefited from broad discretion in this 
area.
 85
 The Court went on to insist on the need to respect certain procedural 
guarantees.
86
 According to the Court:  
 
‘… where an EU institution enjoys broad discretion, a review of compliance 
with certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental importance. Those 
guarantees include the obligation for the ESCB to examine carefully and 
impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in question … .87 
 
Taken together, the above decisions testify to the fact that a duty of care principle 
owed by institutions such as the Commission or indeed the ECB is well established in 
the Court’s case law. Moreover, they show that the Court uses this principle in a 
versatile manner. Indeed in Gauweiler, the Court folded the requirement to ‘examine 
carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation’ into an assessment 
                                                                                                                                                              
is protecting individuals is another way of describing the first of the above requirements (i.e., a rule 
which is ‘intended to confer rights on individuals’). See Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European 
Union (Case T-341/07) [2011] E.C.R. II-07915 at [33] and K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis and K. Gutman, EU 
Procedural Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) p.516. Note that in Nölle II, the Court took the view that the 
breach of the duty had not been sufficiently serious (see Nölle v Council of the European Union and 
Commission (Case T-167/94) [1995] E.C.R. II-02589 at [89]).
 
Specifically, since the Commission 
benefited from discretion in the field in question, a serious breach would have required the 
Commission to have manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its powers (ibid. at [85]).  
81
 For examples, see e.g., Estonia v Commission (Case T-263/07) [2009] E.C.R. II-03463 at [99]; 
UEFA v European Commission (Case C-201/11 P) EU:C:2013:519 at [19]; FIFA v Commission (Case 
C-204/11 P) EU:C:2013:477 at [20]. 
82
 Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-405/07 P) [2008] 
E.C.R. I-08301 at [56]-[57] and [72].   
83
 Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union (Joined Cases C-274/11 
and C-295/11) EU:C:2013:240 at [54]. 
84
 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (Case C-62/14) EU:C:2015:400. 
85
 Ibid. at [68]. The ECB is given wide discretion in implementing monetary policy: see also the legal 
opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in ibid. at [111].  
86
 Ibid. at [69]. 
87
 Ibid. 
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of proportionality.
88
 Clearly there is an affinity between the former and the latter, 
including in those cases where the Court’s review is limited. This is because a failure 
to act with care and impartiality is likely to compromise the reasoning and arguments 
which underpin the choice of a measure, thereby making a measure manifestly 
inappropriate. I will return to the Court’s duty of care principle in the next section 
where I will explain why it should be distinguished from the duty of care under art.1 
of the SSM Regulation. First however, it is necessary to introduce the ECB’s duty of 
care under the said regulation.  
 
The ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market 
 
The ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market is found in 
art.1 of the SSM Regulation, which also sets out the ECB’s objectives when it 
exercises its tasks under the SSM Regulation – i.e., to contribute to the safety and 
soundness of credit institutions, as well as to the stability of the financial system.  
The origin of the ECB’s duty of care can be traced back to a European 
Parliament amendment of the Commission proposal for the SSM Regulation.
 89
 
Initially, art.1 of the Commission proposal only required the ECB to have ‘due regard 
for the unity and integrity of the internal market’. As adopted, the somewhat tortuous 
– or torturous – language of art.1 requires the ECB to have ‘full regard’ and ‘duty of 
care’ for the unity and integrity of the internal market. Thus, art.1 of the SSM 
Regulation states that: 
 
‘[t]his Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to 
contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability 
of the financial system within the Union and each Member State, with full 
regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based 
on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory 
arbitrage’.  
 
As adopted, the ECB’s duty of care under art.1 is both distinct and specific. It is 
distinct because the SSM Regulation ties this duty to the ECB’s tasks under the SSM 
Regulation. As a result, the duty of care of art.1 does not apply to the ECB in its role 
as guardian of the single currency. Nor does it apply to national authorities which are 
part of the SSM.
90
 The point is worth noting because the SSM is made of the ECB 
                                                        
88
 Ibid. at [66]-[77]. See also H. Hofmann, ‘Gauweiler and OMT: Lessons for EU Public Law and the 
European Economic and Monetary Union’, Working Paper Version (19 June 2015) p. 16, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621933 [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
89
 European Parliament (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs), “Report on the proposal for a 
Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating 
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions”, A7-0392/2012 (3 December 2012); European 
Parliament, “Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 May 2013 on the proposal for a 
Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating 
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions”, P7_TA(2013)0213, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-
0213&language=EN [Accessed 23 August 2016]. The proposal for the SSM Regulation (a Council 
Regulation) was negotiated as a package with a proposal amending the European Banking Authority’s 
founding regulation. The former was adopted under the special legislative procedure, but the latter was 
adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.  
90
 See in this context the SSM’s ‘mission statement’, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/mission-statement/mission-statement-of-the-
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and national authorities, and the latter continue to play an important role: a lesser role 
in the micro-prudential field, but a significant role in the macro-prudential field. 
Moreover, as noted in the previous section, internal market disruptions caused by the 
behavior of national authorities were not uncommon in the past.
91
 That said, the 
provisions of art.1 might still come to affect national authorities. For example, they 
might be affected in case where the ECB exercises authority over them. They might 
also be affected if the ECB presses for greater harmonization of national regulatory 
frameworks on the back of its duty of care. Recall that under the SSM Regulation the 
ECB is expected to apply (where relevant) national laws that transpose directives, as 
well as national laws that exercise Member State options.
92
 Variation among national 
frameworks is likely to complicate the ECB’s tasks. As a result, the ECB may take the 
view that it also affects its ability to discharge its duty of care under art.1. Hence, it 
might press for greater harmonization.
93
  
The duty of care of art.1 can also be described as specific. This is because of 
its subject matter: the unity and integrity of the internal market. The latter is according 
to art.1 based on ‘equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing 
regulatory arbitrage’. As noted, concerns over the unity and integrity of the internal 
market were associated with the SSM project, or for that matter the Banking Union 
project, right from the start.
94
 The SSM Regulation does not specify the meaning of 
the unity and integrity of the internal market. But the meaning can be ascertained by 
reference to the general context in which these terms are employed and by reference 
to their ordinary meaning.
95
 In the present context, it is plain that the choice of terms 
is meant to underline the importance of preventing internal market fragmentation, a 
problematic which I described in detail earlier. Meanwhile, the reference to an 
internal market that is ‘based on equal treatment of credit institutions’ underscores the 
need for the ECB to pay attention to a level playing field between institutions. Finally, 
the reference to preventing ‘regulatory arbitrage’ – i.e., preventing market actors from 
taking advantage of differences in regulation or supervision between Member States – 
drives the point home that in a post-crisis world, regulatory arbitrage is viewed as 
undesirable.
96
  
                                                                                                                                                              
ssm/html/index.en.html [Accessed 23 August 2016], which states that actors within the SSM (hence, 
also national authorities that are part of the SSM) are committed to respecting inter alia ‘the unity and 
integrity of the internal market’ without making reference to a duty of care. 
91
 See e.g., text to fn.53. 
92
 See art.4(3) SSM Regulation.  
93
 See in this context, S. Lautenschläger, “Single Supervisory Mechanism – Single Supervisory Law?” 
(27 January 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160127_2.en.html 
[Accessed 23 August 2016], noting that ‘… many variations in national legislation can no longer be 
justified now that we have European banking supervision. … Article 1 of the SSM Regulation requires 
the ECB to carry out prudential supervision with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity 
of the internal market. The Article also refers to the equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to 
preventing regulatory arbitrage. A fragmented regulatory framework makes it difficult for the ECB to 
meet these requirements’. 
94
 European Council, The President, “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (26 June 
2012) p.4, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=17220; European Council, 
“Conclusions” (28/29 June 2012) at [4], 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf [Accessed 23 
August 2016]. 
95
 See e.g., DIR International Film Srl and others (Case C-164/98) [2000] ECR I-00447 at [26]. 
96
 The regulatory arbitrage concern finds expression elsewhere as well: for instance in the founding 
texts of the European Supervisory Authorities or indeed in the concept of a single rulebook. Thus, 
Recital (14) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
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As noted above, the duty of care requirement shares much of its language with 
the requirement of the same article to have ‘full regard’ to the unity and integrity of 
the internal market. The latter is based on the Commission’s proposed text which 
provided that the ECB ought to have ‘due regard for the unity and integrity of the 
internal market’. The distinction between the duty of care and the ‘full regard’ 
requirement is somewhat obscure. This is also because the duty of care concept lacks 
substance. In comparison to the latter, the duty to have full regard to the unity and 
integrity of the internal market could arguably be said to be more closely linked to the 
ECB’s supervisory objectives under the SSM Regulation: that is to contribute to the 
safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system 
within the Union and each Member State. These objectives provide a lens through 
which the ECB is meant to see and interpret the ‘world’ when exercising its functions 
under the SSM Regulation. The ‘full regard’ requirement could be described as part 
of this ‘frame of reference’ which contributes to defining the ECB’s new role,97 even 
though it is clear from the way in which art.1 was drafted that the ‘full regard’ 
requirement is not a supervisory objective under art.1.
98
  
  
Which duty of care for the ECB?  
 
The aim of this section is to reflect on the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and 
integrity of the internal market. Specifically, the objective is to establish what the duty 
ought to entail for the ECB. First however, the Court’s case law on duty of care, 
which I introduced in the previous section, must be distinguished. Hence, I will begin 
by suggesting that the duty of care principle recognized in the case law seen above 
should be distinguished from the ECB’s duty of care under art. 1 of the SSM 
Regulation.   
 
The CJEU concept of care (or diligence)  
 
The ‘duty of care’ label that the Court uses at times to describe the obligation of an 
EU administration to carefully and impartially review all relevant aspects of an 
individual case is something of a misnomer. As noted, this ‘duty of care’ can be 
subsumed into a good administration principle: it is a procedural guarantee, a ‘centre-
piece of procedural impartiality and fairness’.99 As such, it has more affinity with 
procedural rules, such as the German principle of investigation 
(Untersuchungsgrundsatz),
100
 than with a duty of care typical of common law systems 
(e.g. in trust law). The Untersuchungsgrundsatz is found in the German 
Administrative Procedure Act.
101
 It provides (inter alia) that an authority must ‘take 
                                                                                                                                                              
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1 states that the ‘single rulebook ensures a robust and 
uniform regulatory framework facilitating the functioning of the internal market and prevents 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities’. 
97
 Admittedly, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory from a legal point of view since it has no 
solid legal basis. It is rather grounded in an appreciation of what I consider to be broad normative 
orientations and other considerations. 
98
 I will return to this point hereinafter when considering the substance of the duty of care. 
99
 J-P. Schneider, “Basic Structures of Information Management in the European Administrative Union” 
[2014] European Public Law p.89 at p.94. 
100
 § 24 Abs. 2 VwVfG (German Administrative Procedure Act).  
101
 Drawing parallels, see M. Fehling, Verwaltung zwischen Unparteilichkeit and Gestaltungsaufgabe 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001) p.302; T von Danwitz, Verwaltungsrechtliches System und 
Europäische Integration (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996) pp.171-172. 
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account of all circumstances of importance in an individual case, including those 
favourable to the participants’. Affinities between the Untersuchungsgrundsatz and 
the Court’s duty of care principle also extend to their raisons d’être. 102 Thus, the 
Untersuchungsgrundsatz has been associated with a public interest rationale in 
ensuring factually correct decisions in administrative proceedings, but also with the 
need to protect individuals in such proceedings.
103
 In a similar way, the CJEU has on 
a number of occasions underlined that the requirement to act carefully and impartially 
was meant to protect individuals.
104
 Moreover, even in those cases that were divorced 
from an individual protection rationale, the application by the Court of the duty of 
care as a procedural guarantee can easily be squared with a public interest rationale in 
ensuring sound decision-making.
105
  
All this is very different from the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and 
integrity of the internal market. As seen earlier, the latter is primarily about 
addressing threats to the ‘singleness’ of the internal market: the risk of fragmentation 
prompted by actions in the prudential area. It is not about protecting individuals by 
ensuring procedural fairness or impartiality in administrative decision-making.
106
 It is 
also not about ensuring sound or rational decision-making in administrative 
proceedings. Nor is the raison d’être of the ECB’s duty of care intrinsically linked to 
the needs of judicial review. Recall that the duty of care which the Court has 
championed is a means for the Court to exercise control over an EU administration 
especially where the latter benefits from discretion and where judicial review is as a 
result limited.  
That said, it does not follow from what I have said so far that the ECB, when 
acting under the SSM Regulation, is not also subject to the duty of care principle 
which the Court developed in the above case law.
107
 In fact, the establishment of the 
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 See generally Nehl, “Good Administration as Procedural Right and/or General Principle?” (fn.78) 
pp.343-350. 
103
 J. Brandt and M. Sachs, Handbuch Verwaltungsverfahren und Verwaltungsprozess (Heidelberg: C F 
Müller Verlag, 2009) p.52. See also von Danwitz, Verwaltungsrechtliches System und Europäische 
Integration (fn.107) p.172, with respect to the individual protection function of the 
Untersuchungsgrundsatz and the ECJ’s duty of care concept.  
104
 See fn.79.  
105
 See also Nehl, “Good Administration as Procedural Right and/or General Principle?” (fn.78) p.349, 
describing the duty of care (like the duty to state reasons) as ‘process standards involving both the need 
for individual protection and the public interest in ensuring the rationality of the procedure’s final 
outcome’. See also Arizona Chemical BV and Others v Commission of the European Communities 
(Case T-369/03) [2005] ECR II-05839 (Order of the Court of First Instance) at [87]-[88], the Court of 
First Instance described the duty of care as ‘an essential and objective procedural requirement, imposed 
in the public interest …’. By doing so, it sought to differentiate between a duty of care, as applied in 
the context of procedures resulting in the adoption of measures of general application and a duty of 
care, as applied in proceedings resulting in the adoption of individual measures. 
106
 If there is an individual protection aspect, it is not about guaranteeing procedural fairness or 
impartiality, but by affirming within the context of the ECB’s duty of care, an economic actor’s right to 
equal treatment under EU law. Recall that art.1 of the SSM Regulation speaks of a ‘duty of care for the 
unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to 
preventing regulatory arbitrage’. 
107
 Likewise the ECB will be subject to other procedural guarantees, including those listed in art.41 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (right to good administration), which, as noted, was inter alia 
inspired by the Court’s case law on duty of care (see fn.85 above) and which states the right to have 
one’s affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, and lists (in a non-exhaustive 
manner) the right to be heard, the right to have access to one’s file and the duty of an administration to 
give reasons. For a detailed assessment of how art.41 will matter in administrative proceedings under 
the SSM, including where administrative proceedings involve both national competent authorities and 
the ECB, see M. Lamandini, D. Muñoz and J. Álvarez, ‘Depicting the Limits of the SSM’s Supervisory 
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SSM provides a strong rationale for insisting on such a duty. Not only does the ECB 
benefit from discretion when exercising its tasks. In its role as prudential supervisor, it 
has significant powers over (inter alia) supervised entities: for example when deciding 
to authorise an institution to take up the business of a credit institution or when 
withdrawing such an authorisation,
108
 when deciding whether an institution is deemed 
to be significant or less significant in accordance with art.6 of the SSM Regulation; 
when adopting supervisory measures vis-à-vis supervised entities;
109
 when imposing 
administrative penalties;
110
 or taking over the supervision of a less significant 
entity.
111
 The point is not simply academic. A challenge against an ECB decision has 
been brought by Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg.
112
 The case is currently 
pending before the General Court. It concerns a decision by the ECB to treat 
Landeskreditbank as a ‘significant’ entity and hence to put it under its direct 
supervision. As part of its challenge, the applicant claims inter alia that the ECB 
breached ‘its duty to assess and take into consideration diligently and impartially all 
of the relevant facts and points of law of the case at issue’.  
Hence, a duty to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements – 
factual and legal – of an individual case is likely to prove an important procedural 
guarantee for supervised entities.
113
  
 
The concept of care under art.1 of the SSM Regulation 
 
The aim of this final subsection is to reflect on the way in which the ECB ought to 
discharge its duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market. Given that 
the latter is a concept that is distinct from the duty of care principle that the Court has 
fashioned, I am left with the task of determining what it entails for the ECB. This is a 
difficult task given that there is very little in the SSM Regulation which helps to put 
flesh on it. Indeed, given the lack of detail, it does not seem exaggerated to say that 
the duty of care in art.1 of the SSM Regulation is a notion without much substance.  
 
The ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market: a notion 
without substance? 
 
It is common for a duty of care to be underpinned by a certain standard of care. The 
latter provides a benchmark against which the conduct of a person who owes a duty of 
care can be evaluated. In common law systems, the standard may be that of a 
reasonable man or that of an ordinary prudent man. In trust law,
 
for example, the latter 
corresponds to the ‘traditional common law rule’ 114  which requires a trustee ‘to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Powers: the Role of Constitutional Mandates and of Fundamental Rights’ Protection’ (2015) 79 
Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale p.1 at pp. 78-85. See also the provisions that 
were enshrined in the SSM Regulation and the Framework Regulation: e.g. art.22 SSM Regulation or 
arts 25-33 SSM Framework Regulation. 
108
 See art.14 SSM Regulation, arts 73-84 SSM Framework Regulation.  
109
 See art.16 SSM Regulation.  
110
 See art.18 SSM Regulation.  
111
 See art.6(5)(b) SSM Regulation. 
112
 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v ECB (Case T-122/15) [2015] OJ C178/17. 
113
 The ECB’s very own provisions on supervisory procedure must be seen in this light. See e.g., arts 
28 and 29 SSM Framework Regulation.  
114
 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, “Trustees’ Powers and Duties”, Law Com 
No 260, Scot Law Com No 172 (May 1999), p.41, 
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/7912/7989/7339/rep172.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016]. 
 23 
conduct the business of the trust with the same care as an ordinary prudent man of 
business would extend towards his own affairs’.115 Because a standard of care helps to 
operationalize a duty of care, it is an important aspect of it.  
Admittedly, the issue before us is not a common law one and at any rate the 
meaning of a concept in national law is, in order to preserve the autonomous character 
of EU law, generally of little concern to the Court which will ‘to the greatest extent 
possible, interpret the concepts of [EU] law in light of the rules of [EU] law itself’.116 
That said, standards of care have their use in EU law as well: for example the standard 
of a ‘normally prudent and diligent administration’ which the Court has, at least on 
occasions, explicitly articulated in its case law on non-contractual liability and duty of 
diligence.
117
 Unfortunately, the SSM Regulation is silent with regard to a ‘standard of 
care’. In fact, save for the term ‘duty of care’ in art.1, there is nothing in the SSM 
Regulation which mentions or refers to a duty of care. Even Recital 30 which lists the 
‘unity and integrity of the internal market’ alongside the ECB’s supervisory 
objectives makes no mention of a duty of care. The SSM Framework Regulation is 
also silent on the matter.  
Moreover, the ECB has so far said very little about its duty of care. The ECB 
has a mission statement and also supervisory principles. However, both are applicable 
to the SSM as a whole. Since the duty of care only applies to the ECB (and not to 
national authorities), neither the mission statement nor the supervisory principles have 
something to say about a duty of care. The SSM mission statement merely notes that 
the SSM respects the ‘unity and integrity of the internal market’ with no reference to a 
duty of care.
118
 Meanwhile, principle 4 of the SSM’s supervisory principles, which is 
entitled ‘consistency with the single market’ and which together with the other 
supervisory principles is meant to ‘guide the ECB and the NCAs [national competent 
authorities] in performing their tasks’,119 offers no hint on the meaning or content of a 
duty of care.  
Given the lack of detail, including on a standard of care, it does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the 
internal market is currently an idea without much substance. Certainly, it is not a 
fully-fledged concept which as such would be underpinned by a standard of care. The 
latter would not only have given flesh to the ECB’s duty of care; it would also have 
helped to differentiate it from the obligation made to the ECB to have ‘full regard’ to 
the unity and integrity of the internal market. As noted, both requirements share the 
same language.  
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How to discharge the duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market? 
I will focus hereinafter on the question of how the ECB should discharge its 
duty of care. This requires me to put some flesh on the concept. I will begin by 
distinguishing the ECB’s duty of care from its supervisory objectives under art.1 of 
the SSM Regulation. As a reminder, according to art.1, the ECB exercises its tasks 
with a view to contribute to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system. These objectives are common objectives among 
micro- and macro-prudential supervisors. Thus, when performing its tasks under the 
SSM Regulation, the ECB must do so with a view to discharging these objectives. 
The ECB does not have a self-standing objective to promote or safeguard the unity 
and integrity of the internal market. Nor does the ECB have an explicit duty to 
discharge its objectives with care.
120
 The ECB has a duty of care for the unity and 
integrity of the internal market when it exercises its tasks under the SSM Regulation 
in order to deliver the above objectives. All this is clear from the language of art.1.
121
 
Hence, objectives and duty of care should not be mixed up.
122
 For the avoidance of 
doubt, the ECB’s requirement to have ‘full regard’ to the unity and integrity of the 
internal market is not an objective under art.1 either.
123
 It is submitted that the 
requirement to have ‘full regard’ to the unity and integrity of the internal market is 
something that the ECB must ‘only’ consider when performing its tasks with a view 
to discharging the above objectives, even though it is plain that the requirement to 
have full regard means that the ECB must give it the most serious and conscientious 
consideration.
124
    
Admittedly, Recital 30 gives rise to some confusion. It lists the unity and 
integrity of the internal market alongside the ECB’s objectives. However, it does not 
mention a duty of care and at any rate the language of Recital 30 is not in line with 
art.1. The latter is the legally binding provision. To the extent that the ECB performs 
its tasks with a view to delivering its objectives, there is – of course – no reason to 
object if its actions contribute to the unity and integrity of the internal market.
125
 This 
is all the more so because the ECB is not only subject to a duty of care, but also (as 
noted) a duty to take ‘full account’ of the unity and integrity of the internal market.  
The duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market must also be 
differentiated from a duty to achieve a particular result (obligation de résultat). The 
                                                        
120
 For the avoidance of doubt, I am not suggesting that the ECB is not also subject to the Court’s case 
law on duty of care (or diligence) – an obligation to ‘carefully and impartially’ examine all relevant 
aspects of a case – which I discussed above.  
121
 Assuming for a moment that the ECB had among its objectives the goal of safeguarding the unity 
and integrity of the internal market, complications would arise. In case where the latter would underpin 
a conflicting course of action, the ECB might have to balance the unity and integrity of the internal 
market against its other objectives. Such a balancing exercise is not unknown in EU law. See e.g., 
Viking (Case C-438/05) [2007] ECR I-10779 at [78]-[79]. Admittedly, balancing objectives against 
each other might be necessary in any event: e.g. where micro- and macro-prudential objectives point 
towards different courses of action. 
122
 Cf. S. Lautenschläger, “Single Supervisory Mechanism - Achievements after one year” (9 
December 2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp151209_slides.en.pdf 
[Accessed 24 August 2016], who adopts a different reading by suggesting on the basis of art. 1 SSM 
Regulation that one of the objectives of the SSM is to create a ‘supervisory level playing field’.   
123
 The language of art.1 supports this point by clearly differentiating between the ECB’s objectives 
(identified by the words ‘with a view to’) and other requirements. 
124
 This reading is in line with the meaning of the formulation to ‘have regard to’. It will also help to 
avoid conflicts between the ECB’s objectives and the ‘full regard’ requirement. 
125
 Conversely, if the ECB failed to discharge its objectives, it might also fail to fulfill its duty of care if 
such failure undermines the proper working of the internal market.  
 25 
former is not compatible with the latter. Indeed, if the ECB’s duty of care were 
characterized as a duty to achieve a particular result (i.e. to achieve the unity and 
integrity of the internal market), it would no longer matter whether the ECB acted 
with ‘care’: the ECB would breach its duty of care even if it acted with the utmost 
care and attention. All that would matter is that the ECB failed to achieve a particular 
result: to achieve the unity/integrity of the internal market. Moreover, such a ‘results-
based’ obligation would make little sense given that the ECB’s competences are 
limited functionally and geographically. The notion of an obligation to achieve a 
particular result is familiar to lawyers in the French legal system and other 
jurisdictions of the same legal family (e.g. Belgium).
126
 But the notion is known in 
EU law as well. The Court uses it for instance in its case law, juxtaposing a ‘mere 
duty of diligence’ with ‘an obligation to achieve a particular result’.127 Hence, instead 
of committing the ECB to a certain result, it is submitted that the duty of care in art.1 
commits the ECB to a certain behavior. This conclusion imposes itself for a number 
of reasons: first and foremost, it is the interpretation which best gives expression to 
the basic notion of a duty of care: to act with care (or prudence, diligence, etc.) is to 
behave in a certain manner.
 128
 Care, prudence, diligence, etc. all express standards of 
behavior even if in quite a general manner. Focusing on conduct (as opposed to a 
specific result that must be met) also offers a way to avoid conflicts between the duty 
of care and the ECB’s supervisory objectives. Recall that while the ECB’s efforts to 
exercise its prudential tasks will on many occasions serve both its objectives and the 
functioning of the internal market (e.g. by guaranteeing consistent supervisory 
standards), there might well be times where measures which have valid prudential 
purposes have negative effects on free movement. It is submitted that the fact that the 
ECB is subject to a duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market does 
not prevent the ECB from adopting such measures, provided that the ECB acts in an 
appropriate way with respect to the unity and integrity of the internal market.
129
 I will 
offer some suggestions on what is ‘appropriate’ below. For now suffices to note that 
taking a different approach with respect to the duty of care might leave the ECB 
unable to deliver its supervisory objectives. It would also contradict the BIS core 
principles for bank supervision according to which any additional responsibility given 
to bank supervisors should not conflict with their primary objectives (the safety and 
soundness of banks and the banking system).
130
  
I am left with the task of attempting to flesh out the requirements which the 
ECB should satisfy in order to discharge its duty of care. This is a difficult task in the 
abstract, but based on the discussion so far, a number of suggestions can nevertheless 
be made. My starting point is that appropriate behavior is underpinned by appropriate 
processes. In other words, ‘care’ is demonstrated by the steps which the ECB takes in 
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relation to the unity and integrity of the internal market. Steps might include notifying 
or consulting other actors, or coordinating its prudential activities with others 
operating in the prudential field. In case of potential conflicts, it might involve 
demonstrating that it has weighed the benefits of prudential action against any 
potential costs for the unity and integrity of the internal market. Procedures might also 
be put in place in order to monitor the effects of its measures on the internal market. 
Where there is a choice of appropriate measures, the ECB might be required to 
demonstrate that it has taken steps to identify the least onerous measures in terms of 
safeguarding the unity and integrity of the internal market. It might be required to pay 
particular attention to certain effects – for example, ring-fencing side effects (because 
of their impact on the integrity of internal market) – but since the duty also explicitly 
mentions equal treatment and the prevention of regulatory arbitrage, the focus of any 
assessment should also be on the effects of a decision on a level playing field and on 
regulatory arbitrage.  
Many of the above requirements are found in some form or shape elsewhere as 
well. For instance, the basic idea of weighing the benefits of prudential measures (in 
terms of financial stability) against the cost of these measures for the internal market 
is also found in the CRR.
131
 Likewise, EBA in its opinion on macro-prudential rules 
in the CRR/CRD suggested that the ‘benefits in financial stability should be weighed 
against the negative impact these measures may have on the internal market’132 
Obligations to consult or notify are also found elsewhere: for instance in capital 
requirements legislation.
133
 They are supported by various other requirements such as 
duties to cooperate among authorities.
134
 Hence, the duty of care cannot be seen in 
isolation. It is part of a toolkit of measures aimed at safeguarding the internal market 
from potential side effects of prudential action.
135
  
Although the above considerations help to make progress with respect to the 
ECB’s duty of care, the absence of any indication of a standard of care nevertheless 
continues to complicate our task. Since the SSM Regulation is silent on the matter, 
there is no standard against which an observer can assess the ECB’s behavior. Like in 
many other cases where the EU legislature fails to flesh out concepts, the matter 
would ultimately be one for the Court to consider.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to assess the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity 
of the internal market under the SSM Regulation. In order to make sense of this duty, 
the article began by assessing the relationship between prudential supervision and the 
functioning of the internal market. It distinguished the duty of care under the SSM 
Regulation from the Court’s case law on duty of care. It rejected the idea that the duty 
of care committed the ECB to a specific result: i.e., to secure the unity and integrity of 
the internal market. Instead, it argued that the duty of care under art.1 was effectively 
‘conduct-focussed’. Admittedly, it might well be that the Court chooses to take a 
different route by simply amalgamating the duty of care with the ECB’s supervisory 
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objectives.
136
 The Court might thus conclude that objectives and duty of care are 
effectively co-equals and that art.1 simply requires the ECB to balance these ‘values’ 
against each other whenever there is friction between them.
137
 However, such an 
approach would not be satisfactory. It would not give proper effect to the language of 
art.1; it would also fail to give proper recognition to the duty of care concept.  
A more complicated question which the Court will come to face in the future 
concerns the relationship between the ECB’s objectives under the SSM Regulation 
and its primary objective under the Treaties (price stability). The interaction between 
art.1 – especially the financial stability objective – and the ECB’s primary objective is 
not unproblematic. There is room for conflict. However, untangling this relationship 
is a separate question which goes beyond the present enquiry whose focus was firmly 
on the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market.138  
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